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Lauren Berlant has famously problematised the sense of communal belonging wrought by 
sentimental humanism, yet in so doing has presumed a binary between optimism and realism, and 
tendered new strictures on acceptable affect. In suburban ensemble cinema we find an alternate 
view: sentimentality as a place of transition, and a more complex taxonomy of human relationality. 
 
Sentimentality has a long history in literary theory, and more recently writers including Lauren 
Berlant have extended its reach to media and film critique. Famously summarised by James Baldwin in 
1955 as “the mask of cruelty” (14), the experience of sentimentality has earned a particularly poor 
reputation as being synonymous with bigotry. The philosophical underpinnings of sentiment – seeking 
higher truth in the internal, the bodily and meta-physiological, sensation and feeling – translated to a 
literary tradition that, to critics such as Baldwin and Berlant, has appeared to value self-congratulatory 
and self-justifying emotional excess, a means by which a privileged few were attributed the humanity of 
higher feeling (a more profound interiority, and connectedness through superior affect) at the expense 
of others. Berlant reinforces a contemporary conflation of humanism and sentimentality, using both as 
bywords for prejudice: “the critical literature on sentimentality has now long refused the appearance of 
apoliticism brandished by sentimental humanism, connecting it to racist, imperial, and exploitative 
alibis for control” (The Female Complaint 282). 
On the other hand, in a 1999 article June Howard points up the shedding of sentiment’s 
philosophical heritage of mutual empathy and emotional imagination: 
In postbellum America, the literary was often defined against sentimentality and the domestic 
culture of letters. Prestigious writing gradually and unevenly became less openly emotional and 
more ambitiously intellectual, less directly didactic and more conspicuously masculine. 
Antisentimentalism is an important part of that story, especially for literary studies. (73-74) 
In its translation from philosophical doctrine to literary form, Howard argues that sentimentality was 
conflated with domesticity and the feminine. Any principled opposition to such a form then had to 
propose alternative authentic emotional states that sentiment could not reach; thus antisentimental 
analysts are still imposing hierarchies of acceptable affect. 
A contemporaneous reappraisal of antisentimentalism can be witnessed in another unlikely 
source: a cluster of millennial American films I identify as “suburban ensemble dramedies”, so called 
because of their alternating focalisation between characters of divergent generations, genders, 
sexualities, classes, races, and attitudes in a mutating suburban environment. In constantly shifting 
perspectives, the films also move us between satiric, realist and sentimental filmmaking modes, asking 
us to consider a greater range of affective possibilities in tension and in flux. Of these kaleidoscopic 
affects, sentimentality stands out as a significant place of transition – we move through sentimentality, 
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and it has purpose in both fortifying and broadening our field of community identification, 
responsibility and sympathy. I will be looking at some of the more popular suburban ensemble films, 
including Little Miss Sunshine (Jonathan Dayton and Valerie Faris, 2006) and The Kids Are All Right 
(Lisa Cholodenko, 2010), as well as less heralded pictures such as Little Children (Todd Field, 2006) 
and The Oranges (Julian Farino, 2012). With some precursors, like Parenthood (Ron Howard, 1989) a 
decade earlier, the substantial success of American Beauty (Sam Mendes, 1999) could arguably be seen 
as inaugurating this filmmaking trend. 
In this article I will use the suburban ensemble film as a counterpoint to Berlant’s comments 
on sentimentality and related ideals: specifically, this article questions the underlying assumption of a 
binary between optimism and realism, which much of Berlant’s work relies on; her appropriation of 
terms from psychology, such as depressive realism; the elite third person effect of notions such as “the 
good life”, and her lack of specificity regarding alternatives to the sentimental or cruelly optimistic, 
including the conditions of complicating one’s identity in politically acceptable ways.1 
Baldwin and Berlant voice a prevalent assumption in suggesting that sentimentality is somehow 
a defective response concealing conservative values or identity boundaries; however the proposition 
only remains true if we focus singularly on those stories which do reach conservative conclusions and 
ask us to bask uncritically in them. Indeed such films are not hard to find, and Berlant has extended the 
literary critique of sentimentality to cinema adapted from novels including Uncle Tom’s Cabin and 
Show Boat, and the output of celebrities such as Shirley Temple. In The Female Complaint, Berlant 
analyses sentiment’s social orderings and anatomises the conservative values that reinforce gender and 
class norms and protect privilege; it is also true, however, that for every Shirley Temple flick, there are 
examples of films encouraging a relational mutuality founded on respecting difference and striving for 
equality. Stoking sentiment, as we will see, is a means, a tool, not an end in itself. Surely it matters what 
the object of sentimentality is, what we are sentimental about. Berlant, however, suggests that even the 
most radical of these humanist narratives, upon reaching for sentimentality, allows us to relax into 
apoliticism and dismiss critiques of structural disadvantage, as the sense of relation and belonging they 
provide is rarefied and protected – blinding, even. 
The development of a suburban ensemble dramedy mode in American filmmaking after 
American Beauty provides an interesting case study in the use of cinematic sentimentality for 
progressive thought: in such films the audience is rarely allowed to feel sentiment until a progressive 
conclusion is reached. Sentiment may allow us to feel comforted by a conviction, but if this conviction 
is that sometimes life is hard and surprises us, yet we can turn to our families and communities and 
look after one another for consolation or that we need to think generously about one another’s 
misdemeanours and a breadth of different humanness, then is such an apparent pause in reflexivity 
doing anyone any damage?2 Could we not instead call this kind of sharing ‘consolidation’ or ‘solidarity’? 
It is impossible to live in a state of constant reflexivity, so if we are to share conviction through 
sentiment, which in effect asks us to relax into a mutual value (or what we imagine to be a mutual value 
in order to reinforce it), then the value itself should be assessed, not the notion that we may respond 
with sentiment in the first place. 
Berlant assumes a binary between the idealism she locates in sentimentality and a depressive 
realism, which, she says, “in contrast, [is] more accurate” (Berlant, qtd. in McCabe). This is a dubious 
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fortification of a negative bias, extrapolating favourable self-diagnosis of a controversial psychological 
effect to generalised cultural theory, from which any pessimistic sociopolitical prognosis could be 
asserted as being “more accurate”.3 One may exhibit depressive realism, but one cannot be a depressive 
realist any more than a cultural theory can be buttressed as such. Further, Berlant continues to embody 
a tension between personally affected self-searching in works such as “Affect is the New Trauma”, and 
her foundational condescension, particularly throughout Cruel Optimism: the latter in fact seems to 
imply that everyone except Berlant is trapped in a relational nightmare, not clever enough to recognise 
that their imaginary connections to people and things are at the same time aspirational-neoliberal 
fantasies of “the good life”, and thus we are all engaged in some form of self-harm when we relate. The 
hostility toward coherent self-narratives as representative of normalisation, political certitude and lack 
of reflexivity locks us into a self-defeating lack of specificity about the structuring of our identities.4 Yet 
since coherent self-narratives are unavoidable, valorising the state of identity upset in and of itself – 
ironically erecting new identity boundaries – merely permits us to be unclear about the conditions of 
identity flux and politicisation, about thoughts, actions, causes, and the way we transmit ideas about 
our selves through storied behaviours. 5 What exactly is it, we should ask, that we want from identity 
upset? Being specific regarding the particular values we should question is a humility that remains 
vulnerable and open to discovery, in a way that binaristic admonishments of others’ sentimental 
optimism or masochistic fantasy of the good life cannot be. Berlant challenges us only to reimagine 
ourselves on this restrictive continuum – subject to or not subject to hopeful political narratives – and 
so I am doubtful Berlant manages to achieve this specificity. 
The binary between sentimental idealism and depressive realism is imaginary. Brian Wilkie 
points out some of the classist undertones in these readings of the literary sentimental (570-71) and 
spins a neat analogy for thinking about elitist antisentimentalism, or the claim to an attitudinally 
superior cognitive bias in cultural analysis that is allegedly provided by depressive realism: “Sugar is as 
much a fact of life as vomit; one is a soft fact and one a hard one, if you will, but both are facts” (572). 
Similarly, David Foster Wallace uses expository passages in Infinite Jest to casually discard the 
discriminatory binary: “sentiment equals naïveté on this continent” (694). He goes on to facetiously 
connect an essential experience of being “really human” to the “unavoidably sentimental and naive and 
goo-prone” (694-95), at once sympathising with and satirising the presumed alternative to hip cynicism 
as unthinkingly sanguine affective stasis. If such a binary does exist, Wallace muses that sentiment is 
preferable (which at least skirts anhedonia), but this concept of humanness is clearly false and limiting. 
Note also the humour sitting alongside a drive to earnestness, honesty and realism in both Wilkie and 
Wallace’s remarks, as this affective balancing act is an important component in the suburban ensemble 
dramedy that I will look at shortly. Most of the millennial suburban ensemble dramedies recognise that 
neither bias, focusing on one affective state and not the other, would be superior or more realistic – 
instead they illustrate the possibility of affective balance or equilibrium. Films such as Little Miss 
Sunshine or The Kids Are All Right use such recognition to their advantage, yoking human insight from 
the affective spectrum they are able to cover. Little Miss Sunshine features a family moving through 
rage, contempt, grief, sarcasm, scepticism, flippancy, cheer, hope, disappointment, love and 
sentimentality, yet they are permitted all such responses, as is the spectator. The Kids Are All Right 
features reflection on the heredity of bias to particular emotional states, as two children with lesbian 
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mothers meet their biological father, prompting consideration of the unknowable inheritance 
conditions, genetic and cultural, of varied personality traits and coping mechanisms. 
Sentimentality, then, is not “unearned”, to borrow a descriptor popularly attributed to James 
Joyce. These films use sentiment to find a place where we do not know exactly how to feel or what to 
think, as we could equally be laughing or crying, feeling shock or understanding, and embracing or 
rejecting characters and their actions. Screenwriters Lowell Ganz and Babaloo Mandel have 
demonstrated this on a number of occasions, especially in Parenthood and their follow-up film City 
Slickers (Ron Underwood, 1991), which similarly portray sentimentality and humour as alternating 
coping mechanisms, their characters juggling negative and positive biases in dealing with crises both 
existential and physical. We feel the pull of emotional excess – sentiment – but it is charged with 
conflicting knowledge and feeling. This delicious tension, the space where we are not certain exactly 
what a film is eliciting from us because, in a kind of affective verisimilitude, its dynamism paves no 
correct response, is a curiously empowering place to be – it exists elsewhere in cinema too, from the 
horror comedy to the political romantic comedy. Here we can reach a zone of sanctioned affect where 
that affect is not prescriptive, and by stoking a lifelike confusion, we can think more generously, 
receptively and open-heartedly on the subject at hand. 
More specifically, we need to scrutinise the grouping of repartee, oft-unkind riposte, and 
performance gags with genuine attempts at unpacking socio-ethical problems to comprehend the 
purposeful interlacing of drama and comedy in the suburban ensemble film. This could be seen as 
extended from the fluidity between social commentary, sarcastic jibe and demonstrations of familial 
care in the lineage of television sitcoms such as Roseanne through to The Simpsons and Modern Family. 
The tension between pathos and associated moments of bathos shows up both our attempts to dismiss 
that which troubles us with jest, and our impulse to become absorbed by our own woes. We are 
permitted both states, but encouraged not to remain too long with either condition, as we are prompted 
to use one to upset the other – to challenge affective inertia – in our search for answers to difficult 
ethical situations. The technique promotes a kind of sifting through affective responses to find what is 
appropriate, yet none are considered inadequate or incorrect, and all emotive responses are potentially 
useful in finding a way forward. 
So sentimentality is not in and of itself an affective coherence. We can have an affective 
incoherence – an “incompatibility between conceptual and embodied affect” – in features that engage 
sentimentality (Semin and Smith 215). In fact, sentimentality before, after and alongside other emotive 
responses may increase the scope of the upset and reflexivity available, potentially even leading to a 
reduced reliance on stereotypes.6 At the same time, as George McFadden argues, following Charles 
Mauron, affective incoherence nourishes laughter as the critical viewer wonders “how sense and 
nonsense are combined to make comedy, and what kind of adult behaviour correlates with the zany and 
outrageous activity on the stage” (156). Our affective experiences in narrative, however, should be 
recognised as separate from unmediated lived experience – we recognise a level of intentionality in 
emotional cues, so we might refer to attempts to achieve the state of affective incoherence in art by 
another term: a challenge to affective inertia, or a call to affective mobility. Again, we should look at 
sentimentality as a tool or device that can be put to use in this capacity, and not merely as a generic code 
(which might in any case more accurately be called melodrama). 
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As just one example, many of these films demonstrate how anger can be a force for positive 
change – as long as we do not indulge its permanency. The Oranges stands out here, repositioning as 
redemptive possibility the antagonism of people we might otherwise scorn as immoral – in this case an 
adulterous, intergenerational couple whose affair spurs family and friends to reimagine their own lives. 
Sentiment is just one of the responses we move through to patch together our best moral resolution. 
The Oranges makes counterintuitive use of a gentle, pensive, acoustic score at moments of expected 
melodrama and audience disparagement, and its focalisation shifts between characters of differing 
perspectives; later we learn how the indiscretions of some characters have productive effects on others. 
The couple’s exploration of moral ambiguities justifiably enrages those implicated, yet ultimately moves 
everyone along a continuum of affect – including laughter, attempts at deflating their torment, and 
sentimentality, allowing them to access redefined communal attachments and potentialities. Without 
moving through anger, they may not desire change; without levity, they may remain in depression or 
the inertia of resentment; without sentiment, they may refuse to work together to revise relational 
responsibilities. This process allows them to attach to a new life less complacent and more fulfilling than 
before. The perspectives on anger offered by the suburban ensemble dramedy, though, are far from 
homogenous. Junebug (Phil Morrison, 2005) and City Island (Raymond De Felitta, 2009), for instance, 
look at anger arising from class friction, and conflicting demonstrations of belonging required by 
different communities, families and locales (semi-rural suburbia in North Carolina or the Bronx’s City 
Island, for example). 
Problematic as the community may be in identity politics and Berlantian queer theory, as all 
community entails some kind of exclusion, Darwinian humanists such as Ellen Dissanayake suggest 
that such problems cannot be used to dismiss inextricably human impulses: 
… we evolved to need mutuality with other individuals, acceptance by and participation in a 
group, socially shared meanings, assurance that we understand and can capably deal with the 
world, and the opportunity to demonstrate emotional investment in important objects and 
outcomes by acts and experiences of elaborating. (168) 
In denying these human needs, we risk devising an unworkable and self-defeating ethic to live by, 
thereby proffering dissatisfaction and disappointment.7 We imagine ourselves as ethically bound to a 
community in order to reach mutually inclusive goals. This can apply to a cosmopolitan communal 
adherence too. These films position sentiment not just as mutuality, but as an important part of our 
communal governance, diplomacy or decision-making processes, which can lead to outcomes of care 
for a broader spectrum of otherness, and certainly do not preclude ethical or political action – this is 
realised in philosophy and deed by all of the protagonists at the conclusion of Little Children, for 
example.8 Vigilante ex-cop Larry Hedges (Noah Emmerich) realises he has a duty of care to Ronnie 
McGorvey (Jackie Earle Haley) when he discovers that Ronnie has attempted self-castration following 
struggles with paedophilic desire, stigma, and the death of his mother; and a couple involved in an 
adulterous affair, Brad Adamson (Patrick Wilson) and Sarah Pierce (Kate Winslet), must confront the 
inherent self-absorption of their elopement plans, stemming from a belief that they have missed out on 
earlier formative experiences, and reclaim a wider sense of belonging and accountability. Often the 
sentimental component of these films is focused on mutual redemption, a political awakening into a 
new communal care: the characters’ comprehension of their interdependence helps them reconstruct 
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their identities to be more broadly considerate of others. Dan P. McAdams’s research looks at how 
narratives of redemption promote generativity – in fact, he suggests such narratives are integral to 
maintaining generative values beyond the present self (82). “High scores on generativity measures,” he 
writes, “are positively associated with indexes of prosocial behaviour and productive societal 
engagements,” which include “interest in political issues and involvement in the political process” (84). 
The sentimentality of personal redemption within a community – in which we come to care more about 
community – may help shape our behaviour in positive ways, whether or not it is founded on a mythical, 
optimistic or entirely imaginary public. 
If we reach a point of sentimentality in a narrative of social inclusion, however, we may ask 
whether the imagined intimate norm we arrive at, the recognisable conventionality the device relies on, 
and those who are excluded by omission or subtle disassociation, render such a narrative ineffectual in 
changing an exploitative status quo, or positions it above and beyond more active political concerns. So 
we must ask whether, as audiences, “they” (Berlant uses the third person to describe such audiences) 
are even allowed to feel closer to others when they, as Berlant says: 
… take emotions to express something authentic about themselves that they think the world 
should welcome and respect; a mode constituted by affective and emotional intelligibility and 
a kind of generosity, recognition, and solidarity among strangers. Another way to say this is that 
I am interested in a realist account of fantasy, insofar as the political and the social are floated 
by complex and historically specific affective investments. (Berlant, qtd. in McCabe) 
Although this is, on the surface, a good description of the relational experience of sentimentality, it is 
accompanied by some specious correlational reasoning – that sharing values or imagining the 
communal around those values necessarily constitutes a fantasy (in the psychoanalytic sense), and 
cannot be concomitant with political reflexivity. Berlant has identified feelings of belonging as part of 
the problem that sustains political imbalance and class unconsciousness, arguing that it is concurrent 
with unheeded exploitation. However, belonging is part of everything we do: it is an intrinsic condition 
of human sociality. Exploitation, however, is different – there are periods, places, thoughts and actions 
that have varying degrees of exploitation, so it must be subject to change. The need for belonging is 
everywhere in equal measure, in intimate publics as in cosmopolitan fealties. As Frans de Waal notes: 
Individual interests may be served by partnerships (e.g., marriages, friendships) that create a 
long-lasting communal “fitness interdependence” mediated by mutual empathy. Within these 
relationships, partners do not necessarily keep careful track of who did what for whom (Clark 
& Mills 1979), and derive psychological and health benefits not only from receiving but also 
from giving support (Brown & Brown 2006). (292) 
Thus belonging is positively correlated with health outcomes. Once again, as in much post-Foucauldian 
political theory, the identification of a human problem (in this case reconciling community fealty with 
altruistic political action) is given as evidence to dismiss an entire enterprise, to dismiss striving – 
perhaps because problem recognition alone, without hope, is intellectual power. This is, in fact, the 
difficulty of progressivity per se: there are indeed human organisational quandaries and atrocities, so 
those who restate such problems will always be correct; those who submit the optimism of a solution 
remain subject to those who defer to the known challenges. Negative realism as philosophy – and as 
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some kind of antidote to plebeian cruel optimism – matches the miserablist fatalism of the mainstream 
news cycle, and in the process renders itself ineffectual. 
For Berlant, the sentimental inspires an imagined group cohesion which is bigoted, oppressive 
or incorrectly aspirational, but to sustain this view we must resist recognition of the many different ways 
we can imagine ourselves as akin to others: group identification is different from identity fusion, which 
is in turn different from tolerance, and surely there are many more social glues.9 All of these recognised 
varieties of communal identity construction, and the spaces in between them, may be the object of 
sentiment, and may drive compassionate behaviours. 
Harvey Whitehouse’s work makes an important distinction between group identification and 
identity fusion, encompassing different levels of personal accountability felt to others, and different 
activations of self-identity. Blending all kinds of group cohesion and identification into a single 
problematic process without scientific recourse is a dangerous route to simplifying, and thereby 
dehumanising the ways people operate together. A spectrum of degrees of adhesion to social identities 
and fused groups should also be recognised across local experience and extended imaginings, and 
shared ideology does not necessarily have to follow from either cohesion, especially with extended 
fusions (in Berlant, imagined publics). Whitehouse writes: 
Recall that one of the hypothesized features of local fusion is that personal experience, on which 
my sense of self is at least partly constructed, provides the main reference point for sharing a 
common bond. So extended fusion would seem to be a more tentative kind of fusion of self and 
other. Since it depends on external sources as well as direct personal engagement (e.g. 
testimony rather than experience) it carries less conviction. (286) 
This could also translate to ideological conviction. Although we see strong methods for generating a 
fusion by which we might favour peers in a large anonymous grouping – such as routinised doctrinal 
rituals – it does not necessarily follow that we will all adopt the same values in any grouping (consider 
the breadth of dispositions even among one’s immediate family), so we may be looking in the wrong 
place if we are to politicise communities and imagined publics to this extent. Communities can be 
established by interaction rather than shared ideology, which should be seen as a set of behaviours 
constituting a kind of community self-governance that crucially complements state and market, as 
Bowles and Gintis argue; and communities can exist even without the perception of relationality or 
commonality, as Robert J. Sampson explains (“Collective Efficacy Theory” 153). Although we still see 
social groups influencing values and neighbourhood effects in ideological contagion, it seems that 
contact with peers is still key. As in Nicholas A. Christakis’s “Three Degrees of Influence” theory of social 
influence outlined in Connected, the attitudinal and behavioural contagion we exhibit is reduced with 
each degree of separation from direct contact. No modelling of community per se mandates shared 
values or privilege, so we cannot assume imagined communities control the genesis of political 
attitudes. 
Tolerance is another kind of group cohesion in which we neither identify with nor aggress 
against an out-group, and thus encompasses a kind of communal responsibility without affinity. In his 
analysis of the development of D.W. Griffith’s film language, James Chandler suggested at a 2014 
symposium on sentiment that “the sentimental mode mediates the melodramatic content”, 
representing distance from one’s own internality and closeness to another’s, provided by sympathetic 
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face-to-face connection. In this way the sentimental and sympathetic modes work together to prevent 
us from adopting one internal affective environment as we focus on the space between the characters, 
their context, their different perception and their striving to overcome the space between them 
(interceding the intimate affective immobility of melodrama). We find here another potential space for 
affective equilibrium in continuous upset of sole emotional identification. In this way the new language 
could embody Griffith’s concept of tolerance (overtly stated in the title cards for 1916’s Intolerance): if 
one has a differing view to our own, we do not necessarily adopt her or his view through sympathetic 
engagement, but at the same time we would not think of her or him as inhuman or evil. However, as we 
have seen, melodrama is just one device used in the suburban ensemble dramedy; its hyperbolic 
machinations are always mediated by the perceptual biases of other affective modes surrounding it. 
Suggesting an excess beyond the detail of cohesion we have so far been able to gather data on, 
Whitehouse also mentions that: 
While individuals are only capable of fusing with a small number of groups (typically two or 
three at most), it is possible to identify with a great many different groups. This means we can 
build a complex division of labour in which we shift flexibly between roles as changing social 
situations dictate. There is no limit on the size of groups with whom identification is possible. 
(288) 
For some, group cohesion appears to be the problem, but for others with perhaps more faith in the 
concurrence of local community fealty and political cosmopolitanism, a fair scientific deconstruction of 
the diversity of human group identification may suggest opportunities for reducing civil and global 
conflicts, poverty and exclusion.10 
Thus, even though some community fealties may be problematic, this should not mean that all 
of our communal behaviours are – even some exclusionary social groupings are impossible to avoid, 
and some condoned ostracism is necessary to live: ignoring strangers on public transport, for example, 
is not without purpose. But this does not mean we will refuse ethical responsibilities to others outside 
of our social circles. The strictures on social grouping and how we think about our social groupings are 
therefore inadequate philosophies. Even if Berlant accepts a version of communal belonging, this level 
of debate cannot tell us what conditions of belonging make our relationality acceptable; thus we are all 
prescribed a suspicion of our inherent and varied attachments to others. Sentimentality, then, if it 
allows us to feel comforted by feelings of connection to others in our community, is not the problem. 
However we can still ask if conceiving of oneself as “special” because of these feelings is reasonable: a 
number of urban ensemble dramedies, such as Margaret (Kenneth Lonergan, 2011) and the films of 
Nicole Holofcener, actively ask this question. 
It seems that, working within this stringency, no one is allowed to feel comforted by any 
qualities they share with others without risking being immediately denigrated as participating in 
normalisation, fantasy or falsehood. Anything we locate as mutual becomes conventional and thereby 
abhorrently compromising. I conclude that this is an unfair condition to saddle viewers and readers 
with. The ethic proposed by Berlant constitutes, paradoxically, another attempt to restrict parts of our 
identity – in this case our affective identity – for ideological reasons that spuriously relate to how we 
actually treat one another. 
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To summarise, we can see sentimentality as a device rather than having intrinsic ethical value. 
The communities we may attach ourselves to via sentiment are not merely imaginary; communities also 
constitute behaviours we exhibit to one another. The need for belonging is a pancultural phenomenon 
and cannot be realistically appraised as a surmountable problem. Further, identifying with members of 
one’s community does not necessarily mean we will not exhibit kindness or ethical inclusivity to out-
group members. The use of sentiment in stories, in acknowledging a breadth of otherness, may also 
work to extend our cosmopolitan actions by humanising others, and encourages us to find points of 
ethical identification with and commitment to a broader range of living entities. Berlantian affect theory 
needlessly restricts identities and attitudes that do not translate to political or compromising actions, 
and can thus be seen as arguably prejudicial. A third person effect is also discernible: the philosophy 
applies to the relationality of others, but not the writer’s, and is thus elitist. 
Comprehending how the suburban ensemble film appropriates sentimental experience allows 
us to access an alternative to Berlant’s political-affective binaries. The affective spectrum covered in the 
suburban ensemble dramedy permits concurrent diverse emotions in tension with associated ideas and 
attitudes, and opens up a place to truly consider how we might behave given our troubled relationships 
with peers. 
 
Notes 
 
1 I refer to this notion as “identity upset” hereafter. 
2 This is a behaviour, not a relation with an “imagined” or “imagined intimate” public, as Berlant 
argues, referring to Benedict Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community”. 
3 See Moore and Fresco (2012) for a meta-analysis. 
4 At times Berlant self-defensively refers to her own social analysis as “incoherent”, as in the 
alternatives-that-aren’t-alternatives in “A Properly Political Concept of Love” (685-86). 
5 Perhaps this could also be seen as an extension of Jean-François Lyotard’s “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” to a livable ethic. 
6 As suggested by Jeffrey R. Huntsinger’s 2013 research, “Affective Incoherence Reduces 
Reliance on Activated Stereotypes”. 
7 Of the kind Berlant, in Cruel Optimism, seeks to avoid. 
8 C.f. Bowles and Gintis, “Social Capital and Community Governance”. 
9 For example, Lakin et al., “The Chameleon Effect as Social Glue”; Bastian et al., “Pain as Social 
Glue”; Van Vugt and Hart, “Social Identity as Social Glue”. 
10 This is what Whitehouse suggests in “Three Wishes for the World”. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
FORUM | ISSUE 20 Wyatt Moss-Wellington 10 
 
 
Works Cited 
American Beauty. Dir. Sam Mendes. Jinks/Cohen Company, 1999. Film. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
1983. Rev. ed. London; New York: Verso, 2006. Print. 
Baldwin, James. Notes of a Native Son. 1955. Reissue ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. Print. 
Berlant, Lauren. “Affect Is the New Trauma.” Minnesota Review 71.72 (Winter/Spring 2009): 131-36. 
---. Cruel Optimism. Durham: Duke UP, 2011. Print. 
---. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture. Durham: 
Duke UP, 2008. Print. 
---. “A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages.” Cultural Anthropology 26.4 
(2011): 683-91. 
---. “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics.” Sarat, Austin, and Thomas R. Kearns, eds. 
Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the Law. Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 1999. Print. 
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. “Social Capital and Community Governance.” The Economic 
Journal 112.483 (2002): F419-F436. 
Chandler, James. “Melodrama after Sentiment.” Sentiment: A Critical Reassessment, A Collaborative 
Writing/Thinking Workshop presented by Philosophy@UWS, the Writing and Society 
Research Centre (UWS). U of Western Sydney, 8 December 2014. 
Christakis, Nicholas A., and James H. Fowler. Connected: the amazing power of social networks and 
how they shape our lives. London: Harper Press, 2010. Print. 
City Slickers. Dir. Ron Underwood. Columbia, 1991. Film. 
de Waal, Frans B.M. “Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy.” Annual 
Review of Psychology 59.1 (2008): 279-300. 
Dissanayake, Ellen. Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began. Seattle; London: UP of Washington, 2000. 
Print. 
Ferber, Edna. Show Boat. New York: Doubleday, 1926. Print. 
Howard, June. “What Is Sentimentality?” American Literary History 11.1 (Spring 1999): 63-81. 
Huntsinger, Jeffrey R. “Affective Incoherence Reduces Reliance on Activated Stereotypes.” Social 
Cognition 31.3 (June 2013): 405-16. 
Intolerance. Dir. D.W. Griffith. Triangle Distributing Corporation, 1916. Film. 
The Kids Are All Right. Dir. Lisa Cholodenko. Focus Features, 2010. Film. 
Little Children. Dir. Todd Field. Bona Fide; Standard Film Company, 2006. Film. 
Little Miss Sunshine. Dir. Jonathan Dayton and Valerie Faris. Big Beach; Bona Fide; Deep River; Third 
Gear, 2006. Film. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir. Paris: Minuit, 1979. Print. 
Margaret. Dir. Kenneth Lonergan. Gilbert Films; Mirage Enterprises; Scott Rudin Productions, 2011. 
Film. 
McAdams, Dan P. “The Redemptive Self: Generativity and the Stories Americans Live By.” Research in 
Human Development 3.2 (2006): 81-100. 
McCabe, Earl. “Depressive Realism: An Interview with Lauren Berlant.” Hypocrite Reader. 5 June 2011. 
N. pag. Web. 2 July 2014. 
FORUM | ISSUE 20 Wyatt Moss-Wellington 11 
 
 
McFadden, George. Discovering the Comic. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982. Print. 
Modern Family. By Christopher Lloyd, Steven Levitan et al. ABC. September 23, 2009 – present. 
Television. 
Moore, Michael T., and David M. Fresco. “Depressive realism: A meta-analytic review.” Clinical 
Psychology Review 32.6 (August 2012): 496-509. 
The Oranges. Dir. Julian Farino. Olympus Pictures; Likely Story, 2012. Film. 
Parenthood. Dir. Ron Howard. Imagine; Universal, 1989. Film. 
Roseanne. By Roseanne Barr, Matt Williams, et al. ABC. 18 October 1988 – 20 May 1997. Television. 
Sampson, Robert J. “Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and Directions for Future Inquiry.” 
Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory. Ed. Francis T. Cullen, John Paul Wright 
and Kristie R. Blevins. Rutgers, NJ: Transaction, 2006. 149-67. Print. 
Sampson, Robert J. “Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms and the Social Structure of the City.” 
Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms. Ed. Pierre Demeulenaere. New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2011. 227-249. Print. 
Semin, Gün R., and Eliot R. Smith. Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and 
Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. Print. 
The Simpsons. By James L. Brooks, Matt Groening, Sam Simon, et al. Fox. December 17, 1989 – present. 
Television. 
Stowe, Harriet Beecher. Uncle Tom's Cabin; or Life among the Lowly. Boston: John P. Jewett, 1852. 
Print. 
Wallace, David Foster. Infinite Jest: A Novel. Boston: Little, 1996. Print. 
Whitehouse, Harvey. “Three Wishes for the World (with comment).” Cliodynamics 4.2 (2013): 281-323. 
Wilkie, Brian. “What Is Sentimentality?” College English 28.8 (1967): 564-75. 
  
FORUM | ISSUE 20 Wyatt Moss-Wellington 12 
 
 
Author Biography  
Wyatt Moss-Wellington is a PhD student at The University of Sydney. In 2012, he completed an MA 
thesis on the cinema of John Sayles. Research interests include humanistic filmmaking, cine-ethics, 
social realism, literary Darwinism and social narratology. Moss-Wellington has also worked as a 
progressive folk musician, a film industry public relations consultant, and entertainment journalist. 
